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there is some degree of force short of brutality which should
render the procedure unreasonable and therefore violative of
due process. The present criterion protects the individual only
from the more shocking police methods and encourages the wellinformed suspect to resist with great tenacity in hopes of
prompting brutal force to compel submission. It is to this area,
therefore, that we must look to the Court for further clarification.
Larry P. Boudreaux

CRIMINAL LAW

-CULPABILITY

OF THE CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC

"The following persons are and shall be guilty of vagrancy: (1) Habitual drunkards; ... Whoever commits
the crimes of vagrancy shall be fined not more than two
hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than nine
months, or both."'
"Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb or
alarm the public: . . . (3) Appearing in an intoxicated
condition .... Whoever commits the crime of disturbing
the peace shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than ninety days, or
2
both.'
Three recent decisions have cast doubt on the constitutionality of condemning as a criminal the chronic alcoholic who violates laws analogous to the Louisiana statutes set out above.,
In Robinson v. California,4 the Supreme Court held that a statute imprisoning a narcotics addict who had not been guilty of
irregular behavior inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment as made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5
1. LA. R.S. 14:107 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 434, § 1.
2. LA. R.S. 14:103 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 70, § 1, La. Acts
1963, No. 93, § 1.
3. Most state laws dealing with vagrancy and public drunkenness are similar
and find their origin in early English models: For extensive discussion see Dubin
& Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status
Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes
of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW

§3, at 777 (1957).
4. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5. CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11721 provided: "No person shall use,
or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting
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The Court found that the California statute punished the status
of narcotics addiction and not any resulting antisocial or disorderly behavior.0 Relying on Robinson, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ruled, in Driver v. Hinnant,' that public
intoxication is the unwilled and ungovernable "disorder of behavior" exhibited by the chronic alcoholic; therefore, such a person could not be punished for that conduct.8 The court limited

its decision to those acts which are "compulsive as symptomatic
of the disease [of chronic alcoholism]."

Easter v. District of

Columbia1° held that chronic alcoholism is a defense to a charge
of public intoxication and is not itself a crime. While the entire
court agreed that Congress, in passing the Rehabilitation of
Alcoholics Act, 1 did not intend that alcoholics be punished for
public drunkenness, four of the judges also rested their decision
12
on constitutional grounds, citing Driver as authority.
None of these decisions directly affects the status of a
chronic alcoholic in Louisiana, since Robinson dealt with drug
addiction and Driver and Easter are operative only in their respective circuits. Nevertheless, they are indicative of a change
in legal attitudes toward alcoholism and, more particularly, towhen administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the State to
prescribe and administer narcotics . . . . Any person convicted of violating any
provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to
serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail."
(Emphasis added.)
6. LA. R.S. 40:962A (1950), making it a crime "to be or become an addict"
withstood an attack upon its constitutionality based on Robinson in Blouin v.
Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 988 (1964).
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the Louisiana statute, unlike the
California statute, required an intentional use of the drug and that, therefore,
the Robinson decision was not applicable. Accord, Louisiana v. Allgood, 254 F.
Supp, 913 (E.D. La. 1966).
7. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). The defendant, Driver, was 59 years old.
He was first convicted for public intoxication at the age of 24. Since then he
has spent approximately two-thirds of his life in jail as the result of over 200
convictions for public intoxication. Id. at 763.
8. N.C. GEv. STAT. § 14-335 (1907) : "If any person shall be found drunk
or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting ....
lie shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished as is
provided in this section: (12) In . . . Durham . . . County . . . for the third
offense within any twelve months' period such offense is declared a misdemeanor,
punishable as a misdemeanor within the discretion of the court."
9. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
10. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Easter had been convicted 70 times for
intoxication or related behavior since 1937. In 1963 he was arrested 12 times
on charges of public intoxication. Id. at 55. Easter's arrest in this case was
procured pursuant to D.C. CODE § 25-128 (1961) which provides: "(a) No person
shall in the District of Columbia drink any alcoholic beverage in any street,
alley, park,'or parking; . . . no such person shall be drunk or intoxicated in any
street, alley, park, or parking . ... "
11. 61 Stat. 744, c. 472 (1947) ; D.C. CODE § 24-501 (1961).
12. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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ward the chronic alcoholic, as distinguished from the mere
"spree drinker." It is generally recognized that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for a crime. 13 Neither Driver nor Easter
intended to contravene this familiar thesis.1 4 Instead, they
likened the chronic alcoholic's actions to "the movements of an
imbecile or a person in a delirium of a fever"' 5 and found the
habitual inebriate's presence in public an involuntary act, "for
he did not will it."16 Nor can he be held on "the theory that
before the sickness became chronic there was at some earlier
period a voluntary act or series of acts which led to the chronic
condition."17
The basis of these decisions is that chronic alcoholism, like
narcotics addiction, is a disease' and that punishment of one
afflicted with the disease merely because he has exposed himself to the public is cruel and unusual. This was clearly expressed as to narcotics addiction by the court in Robinson:
"It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person
to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease ... a law which made a criminal offense of such
a disease would doubtless be .. .an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment." 19
By recognizing that alcoholism is a disease, the courts acknowledged a conclusion almost universally accepted by medical
authorities. 20, This view is substantiated by the high rate of
13. State v. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 570 (1859) ; People v. Burkhart, 211 Cal.

726, 297 Pac. 11 (1931) ;Perry v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. Rep. 226, 229, 33 S.W.2d
1072, 1073 (1930); Regina v. Gamlen, 175 Eng. Rep. 639 (1858); Pearson's
Case, 168 Eng. Rept. 1108 (1835).
14. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
15. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

16. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
17. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

The

court in Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1966), said "that
the State cannot stamp an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his
drunken public display is involuntary as the result of disease." In Easter, 361
F.2d at 53 the court came to the same conclusion: "In the judge's discretion
the accused may be released but he may not be punished."

18. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1936) : "The chronic alcoholic has not drunk voluntarily, although undoubtedly he did so originally. His
excess now derives from disease." Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50,
52 (D.C. Cir. 1966): "Whatever [chronic alcoholism's]etiological intricacies it
is deemed a sickness whiclf is accompanied with loss of power to control the use
of alcoholic beverages."

19. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
20. The court in Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 and n.6 (4th Cir.
1966) cited the following authorities for the proposition that alcoholism is a
disease. 2 CECIL & LOEB, A TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1625 (10th ed. 1959);
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recidivism among chronic alcoholics committed to jails. 2' How-

ever, the federal courts outside the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits have continued to permit states to send their
public drunkenness offenders to the local drunk-tank. This
practice has led one writer to describe detention centers as revolving door jails through which the alcoholic passes in repeated
sojourns.2 2 Such a "spectacle of repeated cycles of arrests for
'drunkenness' "123 has not solved the alcoholic's problem but has
served to perpetuate it by creating a dependency on the alcohol
and the jail itself. 24 In short, it is generally accepted by medical

and psychiatric authorities that "jail is no place for the alcoholic, ' 25 for he needs rehabilitation rather than punishment.
While these decisions have achieved a socially desirable and
perhaps necessary result, they do present problems in regard
to well-established notions of criminal culpability and judicial
administration. The courts in Driver and Easter pointed out
that although a public drunkenness offender cannot be adjudged
a criminal, he can and should be confined in a rehabilitation
center. 26 It is argued that this would afford the public the deGUTTMACIIER & VEIItOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 318-22
TIiE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 4144 (1960).

(1952) ;

JELLINEK,

21. Of the one and one-half million arrests for public drunkenness recorded by

the FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 1962, twenty percent of the persons arrested
accounted for sixty to eighty percent of the total number of arrests. Rubington,
The Alcoholic and the Jail, 29 FED. Pso. 30 (1962). For anl excellent discussion
on how these repeated arrests affect the chronic drunkenness offender see PITT'MAN
& GORDON, REVOLVING DooR-A STUDY OF TILE CIIRONIC POLICE CASE INEBRIATE
42 (1958). See generally Keller & Efron, The Prevalence of Alcoholism, 16 Q.J.

STUD. ALC. 619 (1955); Utah State Board on Alcoholism, A. Study of Arrests
for Drunkenness, 11 Q.J. STUD. ALC. 695 (1950).
22. "Our method of dealing with [chronic drunkenness offenders] - the "street
cleaning operation 'by which they are swept out of the doorways and alleys and
gutters of our Skid Rows, . . . their meaningless run around through revolving
door jails, their stumbling return to Skid Row,' . . . all this constitutes a violation of basic principles of common sense and common humanity." CITIZENS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CRIME PREVENTION, CALIFORNIA JAILS 16 (1956), quoted in MacCormick, Correctional Views on Alcohol,
Alcoholism, and Crime, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 15, 1.8 (1963).
23. Justice Fortas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Budd v. California, 87 Sup. Ct. 209 (1966), said: "Petitioner's case represents . . . the
spectacle of repeated cycles of arrests for 'drunkenness,' incarceration, release,
and arrest 'for drunkenness' all over again."

24. Selzer, Alcoholism and the Law, the Need for Detection and Treatment,
56 MICH. L. REV. 237

(1957);

Selzer, Hostility as a Barrier to Therapy in

Alcoholism, 31 PSYCttIAT. Q. 301 (1957).
25. Rubington, The Alcoholic and the Jail, 29 FED. PROD. 30 (1962).
26. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1966) : "However. nothing
we have said precludes appropriate detention of him for treatment and rehabilitation so long s he is not marked a criminal." After finding that the public intoxication of a chronic alcoholic lacked the essential ingredients of criminality the
court in Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1966) said:
"We close this discussion with the observation that confinement, e.g. for inquiry
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sired protection against the alcoholic and aid in his recovery.
This would seem especially desirable since it has been authoritatively expressed that alcoholism has the highest recovery potential of any major health problem in the United States today.27 A practical obstacle to the Driver-Easterapproach is that
most states do not have comprehensive treatment facilities. 2
The cost of establishing such facilities and staffing them with
qualified personnel is virtually prohibitive. Therefore, without
adequate treatment facilities, the state must release the offender,
leaving the public no protection against his anti-social conduct,
and him with no treatment for his illness.
The commitment of an alcoholic for treatment against his
will also raises a serious constitutional issue. Since alcoholism
is not a communicable disease, 29 there is no precedent allowing
such compulsory commitment. Although alcoholism is related
to insanity in that it is often the product of mental disorder,
it may be difficult to apply the commitment procedures relating
to insane persons to the alcoholic since the latter suffers from
a milder form of disorder that is often also accompanied by
psychological overtones. Even the civil commitment of insane
persons has been attacked by some commentators as unconstitutional. 80 If the alcoholic is confined until rehabilitated, he will
often serve a "sentence" which would exceed the term he would
have served in jail. Since this confinement could be accomplished in a "civil" proceeding, the courts would also have to
determine if the "restrained" alcoholic is to be afforded constitutional safeguards granted defendants in criminal trials.
Another weakness of these decisions is that the courts have
failed to establish criteria for determining when addiction
reaches the proportions of a disease. Driver accepted the definior treatment, lies within the means available for dealing, constitutionally, with a
menace to society."
27. Rehabilitation of Alcoholics, Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Health,
Education, and Recreation, of the House Committee on the District of Columbia,
93 Cong. Rec. 3356 (1947).
For statistics concerning the percentage cures of
alcoholism see KATZ & THORPE, UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE IN DISTRESS 237 (1955).
28. As late as 1944 there were no public institutions in the United States
which were devoted exclusively to the treatment of alcoholism and at present
there are only a negligible number. Selzer, Alcoholism and the Law, The Need for

Detection and Treatment, 56 MicH. L. REV. 237 (1957) ; Corwin & Cunningham,
Institutional Facilities for the Treatment of Alcoholism, 55 Q.J. STUD. ALC. 9
(1944).
29. The courts have generally recognized that those suffering from communicable diseases may be subjected to compulsory commitment in institutions devoted
to the cure and treatment for such diseases. See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d
648 (Fla. 1952).
30. Note, 79 HAlv. L. REv. 1288 (1966).
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tion set forth by the National Council on Alcoholism which characterizes the habitual inebriate as "a person who is powerless
to stop drinking and whose drinking seriously alters his normal

living pattern."'3 The court also cited definitions by the World
3
Health Organization 32 and the American Medical Association, 3
both of which also stress the element of present involuntariness.
While such definitions are abundant, their vagueness makes
them unsuitable for precise application. Neither have the decisions delineated which drink or arrest separates the chronic al-

coholic from the voluntary or spree drinker. It seems that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case to determine whether the
offender is a chronic alcoholic, yet no formula for this determination has been propounded.
If an intelligent determination of alcoholism is to be made,

the state must provide for examination of a defendant claiming
to be a chronic alcoholic either before or aftef trial.34 If it is
determined that the defendant has the burden of proving his
alcoholic status, 35 he will be saddled with the cost of providing
his own medical and psychiatric evidence. This actually would

be an additional cost to the state, however, since the great majority of these offenders are indigents 3 and would be entitled

to examinations at state expense.
31. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d .761, 763 (4th Cir. 1966).
32. "[A] chronic illness that manifests itself as a disorder of behavior." Id.
at 764.
33. Alcoholics are defined as "those excessive drinkers whose dependence on
alcohol has attained such a degree that it shows a noticeable disturbance or
interference with their bodily or mental health, their interpersonal relations, and
their satisfactory social and economic functioning."
34. LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 650 (1966)

authorizes the court

to make an examination of the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
offense when the defendant alleges insanity. Such a procedure could be provided
for the chronic alcoholic. However, because of the judicial delay and expense
inherent in such a procedure, it is likely that the defendant will merely be allowed
to introduce evidence at the trial in support of his defense of chronic alcoholism.
35. In Louisiana it presently is a well-settled rule that the defendant has
the burden of establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense.
State v. Stewart, 238 La. 1036, 117 So. 2d 583 (1960); State v. Scott, 49 La.
Ann. 253, 21 So. 271 (1897). This rule has been codified in LA. CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE art. 652 (1966). This statute and the prior jurisprudence could easily
be interpreted as placing the burden on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was a chronic alcoholic at the time of the offense.
Whereas sobriety is the normal condition of man and chronic alcoholism is an
abnormal state, the presumption that all men are normal would have to be overcome by the defendant in the same manner as one alleging insanity at the time
of the offense.
36. Bacon, Alcohol, Alcoholism and Crime, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 14

(1963); MacCormick, Correctional Views on Alcohol, Alcoholism and Crime, 9
CRIME & DELINQUENCY

29

FED.

15, 19 (1963) ; Rubington, The Alcoholic and the Jail,

PROB. 30 (1962) ; Selzer, Alcoholism and the Law, The Need for Detec-

tion and Treatment, 56 MICH. L. REv. 237 (1957).
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Determining which acts are "symptomatic of the disease" of
alcoholism presents perhaps the greatest problem, for only these
will be excused. No specific formula can indicate which particular acts will be considered symptoms of alcoholism. 37 However, in both Easter and Driver, the courts focused on the involuntariness which must be present to consider the act symptomatic of the disease. The courts thus seemed to be borrowing
from the well-established principle that involuntary intoxication
is a defense to a crime. 3s From this one could reasonably argue
that any crime committed by the chronic alcoholic in his drunken
stupor is not voluntary and, therefore is an act symptomatic
of the disease. A logical extension of this reasoning would also
afford a defense to crimes committed by persons afflicted with
diseases other than alcoholism, as long as it can be found that
the conduct is a symptom of the particular disease. This would
require the courts to determine the symptoms of every disease
before they could constitutionally impose criminal sanctions. In
view of the restrictive language employed by both courts, it is
highly doubtful such an extension was contemplated. However,
unless these decisions are limited to public drunkenness the
courts leave open the door to the argument that any conduct
by the chronic alcoholic while inebriated cannot be punished.3 9
In reaching its conclusion, the Driver court said Robinson
"sustains, if not commands, the view we take."4 0 However, a
thorough analysis of the Robinson opinion reveals that the court
misplaced its reliance. Robinson only proscribed the punish37. See, e.g.,

STEDMAN,

MEDICAL

DICTIONARY

1456

(20th ed. 1961),

which

defines "symptom" as "any departure from normal function or appearance which

is indicative of disease." BLAKISTON, NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 101.4
(1st ed. 1949) defines the term as "the phenomena of disease which lead to complaints on the part of the patient; subjective signs in contrast to signs which are
objective." As defined by MALLORY, THE SIMPLIFIED MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR
LAWYERS 656 (3d ed. 1960), a "symptom" is "any affectation or evidence which
accompanies disease, as a change in the body or its functions which indicate
disease; these evidences may be subjective or objective."
38. This rule is codified in LA. R.S. 15:15(1) (1950), and is recognized by
the jurisprudence of Louisiana and other states. E.g., State v. Johnston, 207 La.
161, 20 So. 2d 741 (1945) (dictum) ; Choate v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 169, 197
Pac. 1060 (1921). See generally Cutshaw, Some Thoughts on Alcoholism as Involuntary Intoxication, 14 LA. B.J. 159, 160-63 (1966) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW

781, 787 (1957).
39. Such an argument was made for the extension of Robinson v. California,

370 U.S. 660 (1962), in Note, 37 TUL. L. REV. 119 (1962). The author suggested that the narcotics addict could not "be held responsible for crimes he
commits pursuant to his illness" since this would be punishing the disease itself.
Id. at 124. In Note, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 122 (1962) the author asserted that
punishing one addicted to narcotics for acts "compelled" by that addiction is
equivalent to punishing the addict for addiction itself. Id. at 127.
40. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
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ment of the status of narcotic addiction; Driver extended this
immunity to acts which are symptoms of chronic alcoholism. In
view of the general strict construction of Robinson, 41 this seems
to be an unfounded extension of the language of the Supreme
Court. Since Robinson standing alone is inapplicable to situations involving an act, it appears doubtful that it either sustains or commands the result reached in Driver, where the antisocial act of public drunkenness was present. Since the Louisiana vagrancy statute 42 does not require an act but punishes
the status of being a habitual drunkard, it appears that an extension of the Robinson rationale to chronic alcoholism would
invalidate this statute. However, that degree of extension would
not void the disturbing the peace statute which applies only
when the offender acts "in such a manner as would foreseeably
disturb or alarm the public.

' 43

The Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to rule
on the questions presented in Driver and Easter in denying certiorari in Budd v. California.4 Justice Fortas, joined by Justice
Douglas, dissented and urged the case be heard and decided favorably to petitioner's contention that persons suffering from
chronic alcoholism cannot be constitutionally punished for their
presence in public while intoxicated. The Court's refusal to hear
the case indicates it is not yet ready to extend the Robinson rationale to the chronic alcoholic. Until such a decision is reached,
Louisiana, like most states, will continue to incarcerate the
public inebriate pursuant to its vagrancy and public drunkenness
statutes. A change, while theoretically justifiable, may be impossible to implement because of the difficulty of formulating
an economically and administratively feasible plan of dealing
with the chronic alcoholic.
Bill Faller
41. E.g., Louisiana ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368
(1936), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 988 (1964) ; In re DeLaO, 59 Cal.2d 128, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793 (1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856; State v. Margo, 40
N.J. 188, 191 A.2d 43 (1963) ; Salas v. Texas, 365 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Crim. App.
1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 15 (1963).
42. LA. R.S. 14:107 (Supp. 1952).
43. Id. 14:103 (Supp. 1960, 1963).
44. 87 Sup. Ct. 209 (U.S. 1966).

